Edimax BR-6104K Manual do Utilizador

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Página 1 - February 24, 2008

Universal Plug and Play - Dead simple or simplydeadly?Armijn HemelFebruary 24, 2008

Página 2 - About me

UPnP protocol - discoveryFirst step: discover devices on the networkOn boot-up send a HTTP header to UDP port 1900 on239.255.255.250 (this is called H

Página 3

UPnP protocol - discovery (continued)Periodically send notifications to 239.255.255.250 on port 1900 UDP:NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900CAC

Página 4

UPnP protocol - descriptionSecond step: find out what devices can doLOCATION points to XML:Location: http://192.168.1.1:5431/dyndev/uuid:0014-bf09This

Página 5 - Today’s topics and goals

UPnP protocol - controlThird step: controlling a deviceDevices can be controlled by sending SOAP requests to the “controlURL”.There is no authenticati

Página 6

UPnP protocol - eventingFourth step: keeping devices informedChanges in “state variables” are sent over the network to subscribedclients.Clients can s

Página 7 - History of UPnP

UPnP protocol - presentationFifth step: human interfacePresentation is the human controllable interface: the webinterface of thedevice.

Página 8 - UPnP protocol stack

UPnP profilesUPnP defines profiles: a set of actions, state variables, etcetera, thatimplement specific functionality.Standardized profiles:IInternet Gatew

Página 9 - UPnP protocol - addressing

Internet Gateway Device profileIWAN connection or ADSL modem (ADSL modems and (wireless)routers)Ifirewall + Network Address TranslationIDNS server, DHCP

Página 10 - UPnP protocol - discovery

Hacking the I nternet Gateway DeviceThe Internet Gateway Device (IGD) is an interesting target:IIt controls access to and from a LAN. Control the IGD

Página 11

Port forwardingThe Internet Gateway Device profile allows port forwarding (viaWANIPConnection or WANPPPConnection subprofiles).Network Address Translati

Página 12 - UPnP protocol - description

About meProfessional:I1996-2006: computer science at Utrecht UniversityI2004-2006: MSc thesis: NixOSI2000-present: author Linux Magazine NL, Linux Mag

Página 13 - UPnP protocol - control

WANIPConnection and WANPPPConnection subprofilesWANIPConnection and WANPPPConnection subprofiles controlportmapping actions:Iadd a portmappingIdelete a

Página 14 - UPnP protocol - eventing

Port forwarding – SOAP actionAddPortMapping SOAP function takes a few arguments:INewRemoteHost - source of inbound packets, usually empty (i.e. allhos

Página 15 - UPnP protocol - presentation

Example code#! /usr/bin/pythonimport osfrom SOAPpy import *endpoint = "http://10.0.0.138/upnp/control/wanpppcpppoa"namespace = "urn:sch

Página 16 - UPnP profiles

Port forwarding – protocol dumbnessAccording to the specifications NewInternalClient can be set toanother internal machine.Open connections to other ma

Página 17

Port forwarding – implementation errorsSome implementations accept non local machines asNewInternalClient. Connections to NewExternalPort (IGD externa

Página 18

Vulnerable devicesImany Linux based devices with Broadcom chip and Broadcom UPnPstackILinux IGD based devices (primarily Edimax + clones)Inew devices

Página 19 - Port forwarding

Code problemsThe problem is proper parameter checking.Input from SOAP request is often passed to an external com mandunchecked.Risk: possibly execute

Página 20

linux-igd hackMany devices use old code from the Linux IGD project (code slightlyadapted for readability):int pmlist_AddPortMapping (char *protocol, c

Página 21 - Port forwarding – SOAP action

linux-igd hack – continuedThe following Python code sends a SOAP packet which lets the router(Edimax BR-6104K, with old firmware) reboot remotely:serve

Página 22 - Example code

Risks and impactReaction from vendors/“security experts” after my research in 2006:The attacks are not remote, but originate from the LAN, whichmake i

Página 23

A word from our sponsors: Loohuis ConsultingIspecialized hostingIweb development (AJAX and other buzzwords)IGPL license complianceIUPnP securityIroute

Página 24

Risks and impactThe Human Factor:Ipeople want to use UPnPIpeople don’t know how to turn it off, or can’t turn it off(Speedtouch 510 has no option in web

Página 25 - Vulnerable devices

Risks and impactResult of all this:Imillions of vulnerable UPnP capable routers have been sold and arein useIinfected computer is relatively easy to d

Página 26 - Code problems

Risks and impactResearch was published on May 18 2006 (SANE 2006 conference inDelft, the Netherlands).Apart from some media attention things fizzled ou

Página 27

How did this happen?To blame: the ODM development modelItime to marketIfeatures (security is not a feature)Ireally really really tight profit marginsCo

Página 28

More UPnP hacks /Future workIembed this code into security/scanning toolsIhack UPnP A/V profileIattack the UPnP SOAP stackHelp is more than welcome.

Página 29 - Risks and impact

Hacking the UPnP A/V profileUPnP A/V profile is getting used more and more:IPhilips Streamium (some models)IX-Box 360 (limited use)INoxon AudioINetgear

Página 30

Hacking the UPnP A/V profileTwo basic types of devices:1. MediaServer2. MediaRendererMediaServer streams content, MediaRenderer plays content (audio or

Página 31

Hacking the UPnP A/V profilePossible hacks:I“steal” content (DRM protected that was paid for?) from aMediaServer by sending it off the LAN.Iplay content

Página 32

Attacking the UPnP SOAP stacksA few stacks are used:IIntel UPnP SDK/libupnpIcustom stacksSome do just string comparisons instead of implementing a pro

Página 33 - How did this happen?

The end?Will all be OK when UPnP has be en fixed?Nah. Enough other attack vectors on routers:Iembedded web interfaceIDNS (some stacks barf when you ask

Página 34 - More UPnP hacks /Future work

A word from our sponsors: NLUUGIMay 15, 2008: NLUUG spring conference about security.IFall 2008: conference about mobile devicesMore info: http://www.

Página 35 - Hacking the UPnP A/V profile

Today’s topics and goalsIUPnP historyIUPnP protocol stackIdebunk common misconceptions about UPnPIshow errors in UPnP designIshow errors in UPnP imple

Página 36

Universal Plug and Play - introductionBring the desktop “plug and play” concept (Windows 98/Windows ME)to the (local) network.Benefits:Ino configuration

Página 37

History of UPnPIearly 1999 as reaction by Microsoft to Sun’s JINIIearly 2000: first products with UPnP (Windows ME, Intel’s OpenSource UPnP SDK)IWindow

Página 38

UPnP protocol stack0. addressing1. discovery2. description3. control4. eventing5. presentation

Página 39 - The end?

UPnP protocol - addressingZeroth, optional, step. If no DHCP server is found use “auto-addressing”:1. randomly pick an IP address from 169.254/16 IP r

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